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Introduction 
Latin America is the geographic region 
comprising of all the countries on the southern 
part of the continent of North America from 
Cuba onwards as well as the entire continent of 
South America. The Caribbean Islands are also 
included as apart of Latin America as the 
lingua franca in this region is mostly Spanish. 
Historically, it refers to those territories also 
called Ibero-America that were once part of the 
Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires as a 
result of conquests of these lands by these two 
nations after their discovery by explorers. 
Some exceptions are Suriname,Guyana and 
French Guyanawhere Dutch, English and 
French are spoken respectively.  
The countries of Latin American region 
are inhabited by people of indigenous 
American or mixed races from Europe, Africa 
and Asia, including Indians in Suriname. Since 
the end of the cold war this region is 
undergoing some dramatic political, economic, 
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Abstract : Latin America is a highly volatile region. After it was exposed to the rigours of 
colonialism, it has experienced several doses of authoritarian rule before the process of 
democratisation gained momentum in the 1980s. This article analyses the tenor and quality of 
democratisation along socialist lines in three    
identify the positive aspects of socialist democracies in the volatile but resource-rich region  and  
at the same time clearly highlights the shortcomings in the socialist experiments in  Brazil,  Chile 
and Urugay. All these countries are  able to achieve the social democratic goal of high rates of 
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Abstrak : Amerika Latin adalah daerah yang sangat volatile. Setelah itu terkena kerasnya 
kolonialisme, telah mengalami beberapa dosis pemerintahan otoriter sebelum proses demokratisasi 
mendapatkan momentum pada 1980-an. Artikel ini menganalisis tenor dan kualitas demokratisasi 
di sepanjang garis sosialis di tiga negara LatinAmerica. Makalah ini mencoba untuk 
mengidentifikasi aspek-aspek positif dari demokrasi sosialis di wilayah bergejolak namun kaya 
sumber daya dan pada saat yang sama jelas menyoroti kekurangan dalam eksperimen sosialis di 
Brazil, Chili dan Urugay. Semua negara-negara ini mampu mencapai tujuan demokrasi sosial 
tingkat pertumbuhan ekonomi yang tinggi, sementara pada saat yang sama memastikan keadilan 
sosial. Dalam semua ketiga kasus kemiskinan ini turun secara signifikan dan ketimpangan 
pendapatan juga menurun. Namun penulis juga menyoroti bahwa neo-kiri rezim telah sering 
represif terhadap suara minoritas yang mengarah ke rasa keterasingan antara bagian signifikan dari 
populasi mereka. 
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countries  of  Latin America. The paper tries to
serving autocrats and lagging decades if not 
centuries behind the economically advanced 
societies of Europe and North America.
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Historical Background 
Democracy in Latin America was a 
phenomenon that gradually emerged and 
developed in a real sense after the 1980s. 
European exploration and penetration of South 
America started at the beginning of the 16th 
century. Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, 
Portugal claimed what is now Brazil, and 
Spanish claims were established throughout 
the rest of the continent with the exception of 
Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. An 
Iberian culture and Roman Catholicism were 
early New World transplants—as were coffee, 
sugarcane, and wheat. The subjugation of the 
indigenous civilizations was a ruthless 
accompaniment to settlement efforts, 
particularly those of Spain. The Inca Empire, 
centered at Cuzco, Peru, was conquered 
(1531–35) by Francisco Pizarro; other native 
cultures quickly declined or retreated in the 
face of conquest, conversion attempts, and 
subjugation. Spain and Portugal maintained 
their colonies in South America until the first 
quarter of the 19th century after which 
successful revolutions resulted in the creation 
of independent states. The liberated countries 
generally struggled with political instability, 
with revolutions and military dictatorships 
common and economic development hindered. 
Between 1820 and 1920, the continent 
received almost 6 million immigrants, nearly 
all from Europe. Guyana gained independence 
from Great Britain in 1966 and Suriname from 
the Netherlands in 1975. French Guiana is an 
overseas department of France. 
Beginning in the 1970s, road building 
and the clearing of land led to the destruction 
of large areas of the Amazonian rain forests. 
International pressure and changes in 
government policy, especially in Brazil, 
resulted in a decrease in the deforestation rate 
since the late 1980s, although burning and 
illegal logging continue. Efforts to combat the 
illegal drug trade have been largely ineffective. 
Peru is one of the world's largest growers of 
cocoa leaves, and Colombia is a center for the 
drug trade. Economic problems and social 
inequality have led to considerable unrest and 
political instability. Many indigenous peoples, 
angered by centuries of domination by a 
primarily European-descended upper class, 
have demanded a more equal distribution of 
land and power. Despite the increasing 
industrialization of some countries, notably 
Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina, and the 
widespread introduction of free-market 
reforms in the 1990s, high inflation and huge 
foreign debt continued to be major problems 
for many South American countries. Such 
economic problems led to a rise in populist 
political parties and movements in the region 
in the early 21st century, most notably in 
Venezuela and Bolivia. 
 Social democracy and the left in Latin 
America 
While  Europe  has  a  long  tradition 
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America of today. Despite some notable 
exceptions, Latin America gave rise to a 
stereotype that persists to this day of tropical 
republics mired in squalor, ruled by self- 
progresses. Latin America at the dawn of the 
20
th
 century bore little resemblance to the Latin 
changes are speeding up as the 21st century 
technological and  cultural changes. These 
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 democratic politics is relatively new to Latin 
America. The reasons for this can be found in 
the region’s distinctive social structures and 
the political conditions which they gave rise to.
 
Throughout the twentieth century, 
Latin America lacked the kind of developed 
industrial base that spawned the powerful 
organized labour movements of Western 
Europe. The poor were predominantly rural or 
worked in the vast informal urban economy 
which made it difficult to organise cohesive 
class-based movements. In general, the poor 
voted for populist politicians such as Lázaro 
Cárdenas in Mexico, Juan Perón in Argentina 
and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. From the 1930s 
to the 1970s these personalist movements 
supported pro-poor protectionist development 
strategies, allowing them to capture the natural 
social constituency of the left. The Latin 
American left was also excluded from formal 
politics by legal proscription and military 
repression. Latin American politics was highly 
polarised and the ruling classes, as well as the 
United States in the context of the Cold War, 
lived in fear of communist-inspired revolutions.
As a result, the left was often  not  allowed  to
compete  for  political  office. In  the  one  case  
where the left did win a presidential  election,
in Chile in 1970,  it was forced to govern under  
 a  state  of  permanent  political  and  economic 
siege. Eventually, the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’
was brought to a brutal end with  the  Pinochet 
coup of 1973. Because of this  there  was  no 
 social  democratic route available for the Latin 
 American left: it remained ideologically Marxist
and committed to armed revolution as the only
 tenable political strategy. Much of  the left took
inspiration  from  the Cuban Revoluton of 1959
 which showed that a  socialist  alternative  was 
possible on the back of a popular revolt  and  a
guerrilla war. The triumph  of  Fidel  Castro  in
Havana mobilised movement  to  take  up  arms 
right   across  the  region.  These  revolutionary 
movements were largely unsuccessful, with the 
one great exception of the Sandinistas, who 
overthrew the hated Somoza regime in 
Nicaragua in 1979 (Angell, 1996). 
It was the re - democratisation of the 
region during the 1980s that opened up new 
space for a more social democratic left to 
develop. Across Latin America, left-wing 
movements were permitted to compete in 
national elections, and therefore had the space 
to build support within the formal political 
arena. The experience of resistance to 
authoritarian rule, and the fact that left-wing 
activists were generally the principal victims 
of human rights abuses by the military, gave 
these parties a new appreciation of the value of 
liberal democratic political institutions. 
Whereas in the past the left tended to be 
dismissive of electoral politics as a formalistic 
‘bourgeois sham’, ignoringthe realities of 
class-based power, itnow committed itself to 
the protection of human rights and the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union further shifted the 
left away from Marxism and towards a more 
social democratic strategy. Finally, the 
dominance of conservative regimes committed 
to neo-liberal economics during the 1990s 
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meant that the left gradually managed to 
broaden its support from the relatively small 
organised industrial working class and the 
public sector middle class to the wider mass of 
the urban and rural poor. It started to win 
municipal elections and in doing so 
demonstrate that it could be a responsible and 
competent administrator. By the 2000s, the 
fact that neo-liberalism had singularly failed to 
successfully competing for office, social 
of     parliamentary     labour - based       parties
Nevertheless, the left in Latin America 
is as heterogeneous as the region itself and the 
kinds of left governments that emerged over 
the course of the 2000s varied widely. Most 
authors divide them into the three social 
democratic administrations of the southern 
cone and the more radical national-popular 
administrations of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Nicaragua and Ecuador. This is 
inevitably a crude and simplistic distinction, 
and it is often associated with a normative 
argument that there is a  good’ social 
democratic and a ‘ bad’ populist left in the 
region. This author makes no such normative 
judgement: the left everywhere emerges in 
distinct national political and social conditions 
that help to shape the trajectory it follows. 
‘Populism’ is a crude and largely pejorative 
category. 
There is nonetheless a kernel of truth 
in the distinction between these different kinds 
of left. Those that have emerged in Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay share a set of important 
characteristics. They inherited relatively stable 
economies and are committed to their gradual 
reform. They aim to make capitalism work for 
the poor, rather than instigate a more radical 
break with neo-liberalism. They are committed 
‘
to the existing liberal democratic framework, 
rather than seeking to radically re-found their 
countries’ constitutional arrangements. Finally, 
they are based on institutionalised political 
parties with historic links to organisedlabour 
and other social movements. 
This contrasts with the left 
governments that emerged in countries like 
Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
of acute economic and social crisis and 
political polarisation. Many of them benefited 
from oil and gas export bonanzas which freed 
them from some of the constraints imposed by 
international markets. As a result, they 
favoured a much more radical break with the 
neo-liberal model, in particular by pursuing 
greater public ownership of their nations’
natural resource base. They operated in more 
fragile and unstable political systems and were 
structured more as loose personalist 
movements than as political parties. As such, 
they sought to re-found their country’s 
democratic arrangements, shifting from 
traditional liberal democratic institutions to 
more majoritarian and participatory democratic 
forms. 
These lefts have to be understood 
within the distinct national contexts in which 
they emerged and had to govern. This article 
focuses on the social democratic cases because 
they are likely to have more directly applicable 
lessons for the left in Europe. 
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turned to the left in search of a more equitable 
alternative. 
or PT) was formed 
 
Case of Brazil 
The Brazilian Workers’ Party (the 
Partido dos Trabalhadores 
in 1980 by a grassroots coalition of trade 
unionists, Catholic radicals, landless peasants 
and middle class intellectuals, committed to 
building a different kind of left-wing political 
party. The PT was the brainchild of the 
independent unions that had developed out of 
strikes in the 1970s in the Sao Paulo 
automotive industry, headed by the charismatic 
strike leader Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva. The 
PT was in favour of liberal democratic 
institutions and opposed to neo-liberal 
capitalism, but it was critical of classical 
Marxian traditions and committed itself to a 
 
promised meant that many millions of voters 
deliver the higher living standards it had These governments emerged following periods 
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Gradually the PT grew in size, 
managing to establish itself as a powerful force 
in the more developed southern part of the 
country, where the presence of an industrial 
working class and a public sector middle class 
provided it with a core base of social support. 
It stood out as the only party in Brazilian 
politics that was created from the ‘bottom up’ 
by those excluded from Congress, as opposed 
to being created as a vehicle for existing 
congressional elites. It won control of 
numerous municipal governments throughout 
the 1990s and became famous for its own 
distinctive way of governing. In cities like 
Porto Alegre, it experimented with 
‘participatory budgeting’, which involved 
thousands of ordinary poor citizens in making 
decisions over how to spend council funds. It 
was respected for the fact that it was, unlike 
much of Brazilian politics, not corrupt, 
emphasising transparency and eschewing 
traditional clientelistic practices. 
The PT became the main oppositional 
force in the country, with Lula coming second 
in the first three presidential elections since re-
democratisation in 1989, 1994 and 1998. Over 
time the party moderated its political 
programme, aware that it was stuck on about a 
third of the vote and concerned that it had yet 
to convince the average voter that it could 
effectively manage the economy. As such, 
before the 2002 elections Lula wrote a ‘Letter 
to the Brazilian People’ (some joked that it 
was more a ‘ letter to the financial markets’), 
pledging that a PT government would meet the 
country’s obligations to payback its IMF loans 
and would retain the basic macro-economic 
policies of the centre-right government of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Despite this, the 
financial markets reacted to the prospect of a 
Lula victory with some alarm. In the end, Lula 
emerged triumphant, defeating his centre-right 
opponent Jose Serra by 61 per cent to 39 per 
cent, winning more votes than any other 
candidate in Brazilian history. 
Lula‘s victory was historic: not only 
was he the first left-wing candidate to win a 
presidential election in Brazil, he was also the 
first working class Brazilian to do so. The 
crowds of poor supporters that thronged along 
the avenues of Brasilia on inauguration day 
were similar to those that travelled to see the 
Obama inauguration in Washington in 2009. In 
Brazil‘s highly stratified and hierarchical 
society, this was a seminal moment: never 
before had an ordinary worker become 
President. But what was Lula able to do in 
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office? Was he able to achieve the PT’s long-
standing goals of breaking with neo-liberalism, 
reducing poverty and deepening democracy?  
In retrospect, one can evaluate that 
Lula’s experiments with socialist democracies 
was only a partial success and was not free 
from controversies even within his own party. 
Lula’s left-wing supporters were quickly 
disappointed: as he set out in his ‘letter’, Lula 
stuck to the tight monetary and fiscal policies 
of his predecessor, maintaining high interest 
rates and a primary budget surplus to allow 
Brazil to pay off its loans from the IMF. 
Although this constrained the space for growth 
and employment, and for many PT supporters 
looked like siding with the IMF over the social 
needs of the country, it has to be understood 
within the context in which Lula was elected. 
The possibility of Lula’s election had triggered 
alarm in the financial markets leading to an 
increase in the country’s external debt risk 
ratings. The government‘s priority was 
therefore to calm the markets to buy itself the 
space it needed to develop its growth and anti-
 
pluralistic form of reformist socialism.
Amit Mishra, Growth of Democration in Latin America Along Socialist Lines    
In the short term, Lula’s macroeconomic
conservatism  was  relatively  successful  in  its
stated  objectives, leading to low inflation and 
strong balance of payment. An attempt to balance  
by  the books by reforming civil service pensions
led to a congressional rebellion within the  PT
and a number of deputies  being expelled from
 the party 
In the long run, however, we can see 
that Lula’s administration did start a gradual 
shift away from neo-liberalism and towards 
what has been described as a  new ‘
developmentalist’ approach to growth. By 
2005 it managed to pay off the entire IMF loan 
and thus ended the dependency of the country 
on international creditors. Lula’s government 
opposed and effectively sank the Bush 
administration’s Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, favouring instead the strengthening 
of the Mercosur trading bloc which also  
includes Venezuela. Lula saw the state as 
having a leading role in delivering a more 
planned and equitable model of economic 
development. The privatisations of the 
Cardoso government ended. There was a 
strong industrial policy, with the National 
Development Bank providing subsidised loans 
and investments and increasing the public 
sector stake in the utilities privatised by the 
previous government. In 2007 the government 
launched a Growth Acceleration Programme, 
which saw increases in public investment in 
roads, railways and hydro-electric power 
stations. In particular, it used public funds to 
try to narrow the regional disparities between 
the north and south of the country. It was not 
socialism, but nor was it neo-liberalism. 
Although the economy contracted 
slightly in Lula‘s first year, from then on it 
grew, with rates accelerating during his second 
term to records of over 5 per cent a year in 
2007 and 2008. Lula combined this economic 
strategy with something entirely novel in 
Brazilian politics: a commitment to ensuring 
that poverty should be reduced alongside 
economic growth. Lula’s main tool for 
achieving this fall in poverty was the 
BolsaFamilia or family grant scheme. This 
was formed in 2003 from the combination of a 
number of different social security 
programmes and delivered cash transfers of 
between 15 to 95 reais a month depending on 
family income. Access is conditional on 
parents ensuring that their children stay in 
school and undergo regular medical checks. 
The programme was rapidly expanded so that 
by 2006 it covered 11.1 million families or 44 
million Brazilians – around a quarter of the 
population. This was combined with very 
significant increases in the minimum wage 
throughout Lula’s time in office(2), such that it 
is now at its highest level in real terms since 
1972.
130
 
The result has been a growth in 
average real incomes and a very significant 
reduction in poverty: the proportion below the 
poverty line in the main metropolitan regions 
fell from 35 per cent in 2003 to 24 per cent in 
2008. In addition to this, however, Brazil has 
also managed to achieve a narrowing of its 
vast levels of inequality under the Lula 
administration: the Gini co-efficient fell from 
0.627 in 2002 to 0.54 in 2009. There has been 
a fall in the ranks of the poor and a growth in 
the size of the middle class, which by the end 
of Lula‘s time in office made up the majority 
130
Brazil’s campaign: In Lula’s footsteps, The 
Economist, July1st  2010 print edition 
of the population for the first time. If the 
success of any left-wing government is to be 
judged by its success in reducing poverty and 
poverty strategies.
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inequality, then the Lula administration in 
Brazil must be counted as a social democratic 
success story. Finally, what of the deepening 
of democracy? It is in this area where the Lula 
                                                          
government was least successful. The PT did 
not translate its ‘ PT way of governing’ from 
the local to the national level. Although 
various consultative fora were established, the 
PT did not manage to bring a more 
participatory model of governance to Brasilia. 
Indeed, it did not try to involve its social 
movement allies directly in government and 
governed in a relatively conventional manner.  
According to Perry Anderson in his 
article in the London Review on Lula’s 
performance in his tenure, “ From the start, 
Lula had been committed to helping the poor. 
Accommodation of the rich and powerful 
would be necessary, but misery had to be 
tackled more seriously than in the past. His 
first attempt, a Zero Hunger scheme to assure 
minimum sustenance to every Brazilian, was a 
mismanaged fiasco. In his second year, 
however, consolidating various pre-existent 
partial schemes and expanding their coverage, 
he launched the programme that is now 
indelibly associated with him, the 
BolsaFamília, a monthly cash transfer to 
mothers in the lowest income strata, against 
proof that they are sending their children to 
school and getting their health checked. The 
payments are very small – currently $12 per 
child, or an average $35 a month. But they are 
made directly by the federal government, 
cutting out local malversation, and now reach 
more than 12 million households, a quarter of 
the population. The effective cost of the 
programme is a trifle. But its political impact 
has been huge. This is not only because it has 
helped, however modestly, to reduce poverty 
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and stimulate demand in the worst afflicted
regions of the country. No less important has 
been the symbolic message it delivers: that the 
state cares for the lot of every Brazilian, no 
matter how wretched or downtrodden, as 
citizens with social rights in their country. 
Popular identification of Lula with this change 
became his most unshakeable political asset.” 
Materially, a succession of substantial 
increases in the minimum wage was to be of 
much greater significance. These began just as 
the corruption scandals were breaking. In 
2005, the rise was double that of the previous 
year in real terms. In the election year of 2006, 
the rise was still greater. By 2010, the 
cumulative increase in the rate was 50 per cent. 
At about $300 a month, it remains well below 
the earnings of virtually any worker in formal 
employment. But since pensions are indexed to 
the minimum wage, its steady increase has 
directly benefited at least 18 million people – 
the Statute of the Elderly, passed under Lula, 
consolidating their gains. Indirectly, too, it has 
encouraged workers in the informal sector not 
covered by the official rate, who make up the 
majority of the Brazilian workforce, to use the 
minimum as a benchmark to improve what 
they can get from their employers.  
Case of Chile 
The Chilean Socialist Party 
(PartidoSocialista or PS) has a long history 
that stretches back to the 1930s, when it was 
formed by an eclectic mix of social democrats, 
anarchists and Trotskyists disillusioned with 
the dogmatic Soviet line of the Chilean 
Communist Party. The Socialists and 
Communists both enjoyed significant levels of 
support among the country’s relatively sizeable 
industrial working class, especially among the 
unionised miners in the north of the country. 
Like elsewhere in Latin America, Chilean 
at some point inevitable. In coalition with the 
Communists and a number of Christian left 
groups, the PS formed an electoral coalition 
which three times put forward the socialist 
Salvador Allende for the presidency. 
Allende was narrowly elected 
president at his third attempt in 1970 at the 
head of the Popular Unity (PU) coalition. The 
Allende government attempted to bring about a 
transition from capitalism to socialism by 
peaceful parliamentary means. It raised 
salaries and wages, redistributed land from the 
large landowners to the peasantry and 
nationalised key industries. The PU 
government was one of the most radical left-
wing governments ever to be elected by 
democratic means and while its support grew 
during its time in office, so did the degree of 
polarization within the country between the 
PU‘s working class supporters and the upper 
and middle classes. In 1973 the elected 
government was overthrown in a bloody coup 
led by General Pinochet, ushering in two 
decades of brutal military dictatorship. 
The PS and its centre-left sister party 
the Party for Democracy (PPD) emerged from 
military rule ideologically transformed. The 
brutality of military rule had made the 
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politics was profoundly affected by the Cuban 
Revolution, which led to a radicalisation 
within the PS – it declared itself a Leninist 
party and came to regard armed revolution as 
restoration and consolidation of democracy the 
first and most important priority for the left. 
Chilean democracy was fragile: in the 1988 
referendum on whether to end military rule, 
Pinochet had scored a respectable 43 per cent, 
which demonstrated that the general retained 
the support of a significant minority within the 
population. Facing a defeated but still powerful 
military, backed by conservative sectors within 
the population, the left was nervous about 
doing anything in the transition period that 
might undermine a fragile democracy and lead 
to a reversion to military rule. 
The ideological moderation of the 
Chilean PS was also reinforced by the lessons 
the party had learned from the Allende period. 
Essentially many within the PS had come to 
believe that their revolutionary radicalism had 
contributed to the polarisation of politics. If 
they had reached out to the middle classes and 
those who supported the centrist Christian 
Democrats, perhaps the catastrophe could have 
been avoided. In exile and under the conditions 
of military rule, the party had moved from the 
Leninism of its past to a much more moderate 
social democratic disposition. Following the 
first democratic elections in 1990, the PS 
found itself in government as the smaller 
coalition partner in a government headed by 
the Christian Democrats. The Concertación, as 
the centre-left coalition was called, governed 
Chile for the first twenty years of its new 
democracy from 1990 to 2010. Between 1990 
and 2000 it was led by Christian Democratic 
presidents Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei, 
but from 2000 it was headed by Socialists 
Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet. 
The Concertación sustained the broad 
parameters of the neo-liberal economic 
reforms introduced by General Pinochet. It 
pursued orthodox fiscal and monetary policies 
to sustain macroeconomic stability. It 
supported a liberalised trade regime and 
reduced tariffs. Unlike the Brazilian and 
Uruguayan lefts it eschewed a regionalist trade 
agenda through Mercosur, preferring bilateral 
agreements, including with the United States. 
In terms of delivering economic growth this 
model worked: Chile grew at an average of 5.1 
per cent per annum during those twenty years. 
164
fundamentally from it.
If the Concertación sustained the free 
market reforms of the Pinochet period, it 
departed from the Pinochet legacy by investing 
massively in social programmes. The 
minimum wage was increased and there was 
an early and rapid expansion of targeted 
programmes of social assistance that offered 
financial support and help with education and 
training. There was a massive increase in 
investment in the public health and educational 
systems. The Lagos administration introduced 
a major health reform that guaranteed basic 
minimum services for all and established a 
system of universal unemployment insurance. 
The Bachelet administration established a 
basic minimum pension and a universal system 
of day care and pre-school nurseries.The social 
outcomes were impressive. Poverty fell from 
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The Chilean left chose to ride the neo-liberal 
economic wave rather than depart 
 
GDP per capita was $4,542 in 1989: in 2009 it 
was $14,299. In 2010 Chile became the first 
South American country to join the OECD. 
38.8 per cent of the population in 1989 to just 
13.7 per cent in 2009. Income inequality also 
marginally decreased from a Gini co-efficient 
of 0.56 in 1990 to 0.53 in 2006. 
The Chilean left can also be seen to 
have been successful in delivering important 
democratic reforms. When it came to office in 
1990, there remained important so-called 
‘authoritarian enclaves’ within the Chilean 
constitution. The Lagos administration 
removed non-elected senators appointed by the 
military, increased the power of congress, and 
improved civilian control over the military. In 
terms of providing restitution for the victims of 
human rights abuses, progress has been slow 
and incomplete but steady. Since 2000, 779 
former agents of the military regime have been 
indicted, charged or sentenced for crimes 
committed during the dictatorship. A 
commission to investigate torture and political 
imprisonment has resulted in the majority of 
victims receiving some form of reparation. 
Case of Uruguay 
The Uruguayan Broad Front 
(Frente Amplio or FA) was formed in 1971 as a 
‘popular front  style coalition involving the 
Uruguayan Socialist and Communist parties, 
alongside Christian Democrats, independent 
Marxists and defectors from the two dominant 
political parties – the Blancos and the 
Colorados. Proscribed and repressed during the 
military dictatorship (1973-1984), the FA re-
emerged during the democratic period to 
become the major opposition force in the 
country. Unlike the Chilean PS, it had not 
undergone a radical ideological transformation 
’
during military rule –
 
largely because, unlike
the PS, it had not been in power when the coup 
hit and therefore felt less need to reassess its 
own political strategy. 
As the Blancos and Colorados shared 
government power and introduced a gradual 
series of neo-liberal economic reforms 
including privatisations and welfare 
retrenchment, the FA gradually extended its 
popular support. It gained experience of public 
administration after it captured the mayoralty 
of Montevideo in 1989. As the traditional 
parties that had created Uruguay’s welfare 
state abandoned it, the FA moved in as the 
defender of the poor and the welfare system, 
extending its support from the industrial 
workers and middle class intellectuals to wider 
social strata, including the urban poor. 
Following the financial crisis of 2002, the FA 
candidate TabaréVázquez was elected as his 
country’s first leftist president with 50 per cent 
The FA can be considered as the most 
left-leaning of our three social democratic 
cases, simply because it has departed most 
clearly from neo-liberalism in its approach. 
First, while retaining an orthodox macroeconomic
 policy, the FA   has actively  sought  to shift  
towards a more regionally oriented and state-
-
led  development  strategy. This  has  involved
public    investment    in    education,   strategic  
industries and infrastructure, as well as support  
for regional integration 
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of the vote on the first round in 2004. The FA 
candidate and former Tupamaro guerilla 
fighter Jose ‘Pepe’ Mujica was later elected in 
the 2009 election, sustaining the left in power 
for a further five years. 
 
through  Mercosur. In  
line with this commiyment, the FA government 
rejected  signing a proposed  bilateral free trade 
agreement with the Bush administration. This 
economic strategy has proved successful, with 
strong growth leading to a fall in the 
unemployment rate from 13.1 per cent to 7.5 
per cent in 2008. The generation of jobs in the 
formal economy has led to a decrease in the 
proportion of people employed in the informal 
economy from 42 per cent to 33 per cent. 
Second, the FA has achieved some 
significant advances in social policy and has 
done so by using a more heterodox range of 
policy tools than those applied in Brazil or 
Chile. The FA introduced a number of labour 
market reforms that led to increases in real 
wages. It increased the minimum wage by 63 
per cent in real terms in its first term. It also 
reintroduced compulsory collective wage 
bargaining through a system of wage councils, 
which had a long history in Uruguay but were 
abolished by the Lacalle government in 1992. 
This reform strengthened trade unions, whose 
membership rose from 130,000 to 320,000 in 
2008 and contributed to an increase in real 
wages of 24.9 per cent during the FA’s first 
term in office. 
The government also reformed taxes, 
making income taxes more progressive and 
significantly cutting sales taxes, which it is 
estimated had a positive impact on income 
distribution. In 2005 a large scale conditional 
cash transfer programme (PANES) was 
introduced, which helped provide food, 
financial assistance and health care. When that 
programme ended in January 2008, an old 
conditional cash transfer programme was 
redesigned (AsignacionesFamiliares), and the 
amount of this transfer was significantly 
increased. This programme aims to cover half 
of the population under 18 years old in 
Uruguay.
 
These policies were successful in 
reducing both poverty and income inequality. 
The proportion of people living below the 
poverty line fell from 31.9 per cent in 2004 to 
20.5 per cent in 2008. Poverty among children 
fell from 55.3 per cent of children in 2004 to 
38 per cent in 2008. Income inequality fell 
from a Gini co-efficient of 0.46 in 2004 to 
0.424 in 2008, the lowest in Latin America. 
Finally, the FA has implemented some 
important measures in the area of democratic 
reform. On the issue of protection of human 
rights, Vázquez forced the military to 
cooperate with a successful investigation to 
find the remains of those who had disappeared 
under the military regime. In terms of public 
participation, the left has introduced a 
corporatist-style national economic council to 
bring together unions, employers and 
government to reach agreements on the 
country‘s economic strategy.  
The Syndrome of Authoritarian Democracy 
The causes of these afflictions vary 
166
heavy doses of authoritarianism and 
corruption. But the United States has also 
made a substantial contribution. The traditional 
Cold War inclination to support repressive 
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from country to country. Some are purely 
internal, rooted in socioeconomic inequality 
and poverty and political cultures laden with 
military regimes simply because they were 
bulwarks against communism strengthened 
anti-democratic structures and practices that 
continue to haunt these countries today. At the 
same time, the seemingly unquenchable US 
appetite for drugs has led to the rise of 
powerful Latin American mafias and narcotics 
networks that have penetrated local economies, 
making them dependent on drug money, and 
that have subverted political institutions, 
weakening democracy and in some cases 
creating virtual narcostates. 
Moreover, even with the best of 
intentions--and US intentions are not always 
pure-Washington's policies sometimes have 
precisely the opposite effect from what is 
intended. It can be argued, for instance, that 
there is a central contradiction in the Latin 
American strategy of the US. While 
encouraging democracy on the one hand, the 
United States is simultaneously strengthening 
the very forces (especially the military) that 
have traditionally constituted the greatest 
threat to democracy. The upshot has been the 
containment and weakening of democratic 
institutions and processes and the development 
of a hybrid form of "authoritarian democracy." 
131
 The point here is that the economic 
hardships and social dislocations caused by a 
neoliberal US economic strategy have led 
many Latin American governments to adopt 
authoritarian measures in order to maintain 
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public order and national security. And so 
civilian presidents, allied with military forces, 
are creating limited and militarized forms of 
democracy as they carry out economic 
restructuring. Executives have used national 
security laws similar to those of past military 
dictatorships and mobilized the military and 
security forces to enforce order. In turn, new 
US-sponsored roles and missions for the armed 
forces have drawn them deeper into the 
political realm and legitimized their 
involvement in social control and guardianship 
activities.     Eight    trends   or   tendencies   in 
 particular,   illustrate   this   phenomenon  in   a  
 
diverse array of nations.
132
 
The first is the enlargement of the 
military's presence in civilian institutions. This 
is perhaps most striking in Venezuela, where 
politics and society have been militarized to an 
extent unwitnessed since the restoration of 
democracy in 1958. Under Hugo Chavez 
dozens of military officers have served as 
presidential advisors, cabinet members, 
governors, and congressmen, as well as in 
many other important government posts. Army 
doctors are working in civilian hospitals, 
soldiers are building schools and highways, 
military doctrine is being taught in schools. In 
other countries, too, armed forces have 
increasingly been performing social welfare 
and infrastructural roles reminiscent of the 
"civic action" programs that facilitated the 
military's entrance into the political arena in 
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the 1960s.
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.  In many instances, they have 
acquired substantial business empires, both in 
defense industries and in areas of the economy 
traditionally left to civilians. 
Second, there is the growing use of 
authoritarian practices by civilian 
governments, as seen in the emasculation of 
civil liberties and the free press, the 
marginalization of the congress and courts, and 
the resort to electoral fraud in Fujimori's Peru. 
But again Peru, though the most notorious 
case, has not been alone. In a number of 
countries--Venezuela under Chavez and 
Argentina under Menem come quickly to 
mind--strong executives, backed by the 
military and security forces, have dominated 
the policy process, bypassed constitutional 
constraints, intimidated the opposition, and 
limited political participation  
Third, there is the creation or 
resurrection of domestic security and 
intelligence doctrines and missions for the 
military. An obvious example is the 
widespread employment of the Mexican armed 
forces for internal policing and 
counternarcotics operations. Again, these are 
increasingly common concerns for Latin 
American militaries. As drug trafficking and 
violent crime have spread, they have 
undermined political and socioeconomic 
institutions, increased public insecurity, and 
overwhelmed the abilities of police, courts, 
                                                          
and other civilian institutions to maintain the 
rule of law. In addition, growing social unrest 
and the continuation (in Peru), resurgence (in 
Mexico and Colombia), or threatened spillover 
(in Colombia's neighbors) of guerrilla wars 
have encouraged militaries to refocus on 
traditional “low-intensity conflict”--i.e. counter-
insurgency and counterrorism missions. 
Fourth is the use of political 
intelligence organizations by civilian 
governments. This practice is not yet 
commonplace, but it could become so if the 
slide toward authoritarianism continues. The 
most notorious case is in Peru, under 
VladimiroMontesinos, the shadowy head of 
the National Intelligence Service (SIN). 
Montesinos played a central role not only in 
the Fujimori government's counterinsurgency 
and counternarcotics campaigns, but in the 
president's wars against the political 
opposition. He was a major force in the 
shutdown of Congress and the Supreme Court 
in 1992, in the subsequent manipulation of 
judges and the news media, and in the 
eavesdropping and other "dirty tricks" that 
plagued the 1995 and 2000 presidential 
elections. Some of these same practices 
(though less extensive) occurred in Argentina 
under the Menem administration, where the 
State Intelligence Agency (SIDE) and parallel 
intelligence groups harassed and spied on the 
opposition. 
Fifth is the continuing impunity for 
human rights violators. Until recently, very 
little had been done to bring to justice military 
officers who had carried out assassinations, 
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torture, and other abuses during the "dirty 
wars" of the 1970s and 1980s. That may now 
be changing in a few countries--the move to 
try General Pinochet for the abuses that 
occurred under his regime is the most striking 
example--but it remains to be seen how far 
these issues will be pressed. More generally, 
democratic governments have treated this issue 
gingerly for fear of triggering a military 
backlash. That, in turn, may have encouraged 
continuing human rights violations by leaving 
the impression that those who engage in such 
practices can do so with impunity. 
Sixth is the growing resort to the use 
of paramilitary groups and unregulated private 
security agencies. A good example of the latter 
168
is in Haiti. Private security forces in Port-au-
Prince have more personnel, many of whom 
are more experienced and better armed, than 
the Haitian National Police. As for the 
paramilitaries, the most striking example is 
provided by Colombia. Paramilitaries are the 
most rapidly growing violent group in the 
country today. They are growing faster than 
the FARC guerrillas and are responsible for 
most political assassinations. Moreover, some 
of these elements continue to have close ties 
with and receive aid from the Colombian 
military.  
Seventh, there has been a growing 
trend toward "continuismo," of presidents 
attempting to extend their time in office by 
amending or reinterpreting the constitution to 
allow themselves second or, in some cases, 
third terms. While there is nothing inherently 
wrong with a president having more than one 
term-- after all, we permit this in the United 
States--given Latin America’s long history of 
authoritarianism it should make observers a bit 
nervous. At a minimum, it gives the 
impression that constitutions are being 
manipulated so that certain presidents can stay 
in power indefinitely. And that is cause for 
concern, especially when the democratic 
credentials of some of these individuals 
(Fujimori, Chavez, Menem) have been suspect. 
Finally, an eighth trend is the recent 
tendency for retired military officers to enter 
presidential politics. Now again, there is 
nothing inherently wrong with this. But given 
the region's long history of military rule, it is 
not reassuring. At the least, it blurs the 
distinction between military and civilian 
government and gives the appearance--
justifiable or not--that the armed forces are 
perpetuating their power through the back 
door. Here one can simply note the successful 
election campaigns of Presidents Chavez in 
Venezuela and Banzer in Bolivia, and the less-
successful efforts of Lino Oviedo in Paraguay 
and Harold Bedoya in Colombia. And if that 
isn't enough, one might also note that the 
recent presidential election in Venezuela 
featured no less than two retired colonels, 
Hugo Chavez and Francisco Arias Cardenas. 
Conclusion
 
In  the  paper  as we have examined the
emerging trends of democratization on 
socialistic lines in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
the following scenario clearly emerges:  
There are strong grounds to regard the 
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experiments of democratization in these three 
countries as successful. They were all able to 
achieve the social democratic goal of high 
rates of economic growth while at the same 
time ensuring social justice. In all three cases 
poverty reduced significantly and income 
inequality also decreased.  Even if some of the 
nations of Western Europe had an experience 
of developing democracy by combining it with 
socialism, yet one can gain some insight from 
the Latin American experiences from a 
comparative perspective.The Latin Americans 
have achieved this by combining orthodox 
macro-economic policies that pleased the 
markets with the implementation of 
redistributive social policies. Many of the 
leaders of these nations were fortunate of 
course to have come to office during a 
commodity price boom which produced strong 
growth across the region and which enabled it 
to avoid the worst effects of the 2008 financial 
crash. 
There were, however, some basic 
differences in the approaches of these 
governments. The regime in Uruguay was able 
to adopt a much more leftist approach on 
 economic and social policies than its 
counterparts in Chile and Brazil. One reason 
for this is that neo-liberalism was never 
successfully embedded in Uruguay’s political 
economy. Wage councils have a long history 
in Uruguay and employers were not especially 
resistant to their reintroduction. The state has 
always played a very powerful role in the 
economy and privatization was successfully 
blocked prior to the Left assuming office. The  
government in office was anchored firmly 
through a grassroots political movement that 
kept its leaders true to a more leftist approach. 
It was in Chile that the leftist regime 
departed most radically from a traditional 
social democratic approach to economic 
management, more or less leaving free market 
reforms intact and resisting the 
developmentalist agenda pursued by the PT 
and the FA. To understand thisstrategy ,one 
has to appreciate the very radical process of 
ideological revisionism which  the Chilean left 
went through  after  the overthrow of the 
Allende government. This motivated the new 
rulers to break more radically from traditional 
socialism than in comparison with the 
Brazilian and Uruguayan cases. It is also true 
that in the Chilean case, democratic rule was 
much more fragile than in the other two cases. 
Here the military retained significant support 
and it left behind powerful constitutional 
impediments to what the democratic 
government could do in office. The left in 
Chile had much less room for political 
manoeuvre and hence tried to tame neo-
liberalism rather than restructure it. In spite of 
their differences, these left of centre 
governments in these three countries have 
demonstrated that social democracy is possible 
in Latin America. While there are also some 
drawbacks involved in these social democratic 
systems. In the name of majority or populist 
approach practised in these socialist 
democratic countries, they have been ignoring 
the voice of the minorities such as the 
aborigines of Latin America. These so-called 
popular regimes have been repressive towards 
their interests. So there should be a balance of 
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policies introduced by the regimes with the 
welfare of the minorities or indigenous people 
equally to be kept in mind as the majorities for 
the socialist democracy to be fairly successful 
in Europe. On the brighter side, taking a 
lessons learned approach, the respectably good 
performance of socialist democracy in Latin 
America would also give a good example for 
the people to voice their protests against the 
authoriarianism or even socialist regimes in 
many nations of Africa or even Asia, like 
China, besides giving comparatively a good 
lesson for socialist democracy to develop in 
Europe. It could make a good contribution to 
resolve the economic downpour in many 
nations of Europe through socio-economic 
policies based on humanism.
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